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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jeremiah Spicer appeals, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by
revoking his probation and executing his sentence without modification.

He also

contends that the Idaho Supreme Court's decision to deny his motion to augment the
record with certain transcripts constituted a violation of his due process rights.
The State responds to the due process issue, arguing that the Idaho Court of
Appeals lacks the authority to rule on that issue. It also argues that, based on the Idaho
Supreme Court's recent decision in State v. Brunet, _

Idaho _ , 316 P.3d 640

(2013), reh'g denied, Mr. Spicer has failed to show a colorable need for the transcripts,
and thus, has failed to show a violation of his rights. Finally, it argues that there is no
violation because the appellate record contains all the relevant sentencing materials.
As to the State's argument that the Court of Appeals would not have the authority
to rule on this issue, that argument is erroneous because, as this is a valid issue to raise
on appeal, the decision to assign the case to the Court of Appeals would give it that
authority under the current appellate rules. However, in the event the State is correct in
this argument, an order assigning this case to the Court of Appeals despite the lack of
authority to decide the issue would constitute a separate violation of Mr. Spicer's due
process rights, as it would deprive him of a meaningful opportunity to be heard on
appeal.
On the merits of Mr. Spicer's request for the transcripts, the State's arguments
misapply the constitutional standard and, as a result, improperly shift the burden of
proof. Under United States Supreme Court precedent, if the grounds of appeal (i.e., the
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record itself) make out a colorable need for the transcripts, the State bears the burden
of demonstrating that an alternative option for providing an adequate appellate record
exists.

In this case, the grounds of appeal do make out a colorable need for the

requested transcripts, as the evidence presented during those hearings was relevant to
the district court's sentencing decisions and was part of the entire record available to
the district court when it ultimately revoked Mr. Spicer's probation. The State has not
met its burden to demonstrate that an adequate alternative of Mr. Spicer's statements of
allocution made during the sentencing, disposition, and rider review hearings is
available to provide an adequate record. The other materials, which the State claims
provide an adequate record, do not actually contain a record of those statements, and
therefore are not an adequate alternative to the verbatim transcripts.

Therefore, its

arguments on the due process violation issue fail.
As to the revocation of probation and the execution of Mr. Spicer's sentence, the
State simply argues that the district court's decisions were not an abuse of discretion.
Since those arguments are not remarkable, no further argument will be made in that
regard.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Spicer's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUES
1.

Whether the Idaho Supreme Court denied Mr. Spicer due process and equal
protection when it denied his motion to augment the record with transcripts
necessary for review of the issues on appeal.

2.

Whether the district court abused its discretion when it revoked Mr. Spicer's
probation or, alternatively, when it executed his sentence without modification
when it did so.
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ARGUMENT
I.
The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Spicer Due Process And Equal Protection When
It Denied His Motion To Augment The Record With Transcripts Necessary For Review
Of The Issues On Appeal

A.

Should This Case Be Assigned To The Court Of Appeals, That Court Would
Have The Authority To Rule On All The Issues Raised In This Appeal
The Idaho Supreme Court has indicated that the question of whether the

appellate record is complete is a valid issue to raise on appeal.

See e.g.,

Murphy v. State,_ Idaho_, 2014 WL 712695, 6-7 (2014), not yet final (addressing
the merits of the petitioner's argument that the incomplete appellate record violated her
due process rights); Brunet, 155 Idaho at 726-28 (same).

Nevertheless, the State

contends that the Court of Appeals would be without the authority to rule on that issue,
should this case be assigned to that Court.

(Resp. Br., p.4 n.2.)

However, Idaho

Appellate Rule 108 requires the Court of Appeals to rule on the merits of all cases to
which it is assigned by the Supreme Court:
Cases Reserved to Supreme Court. The Court of Appeals shall hear and
decide all cases assigned to it by the Supreme Court; provided that the
Supreme Court will not assign the following cases:
(1) Proceedings invoking the original jurisdiction of the Idaho
Supreme Court;
(2) Appeals from imposition of sentences of capital punishment in
criminal cases;
(3) Appeals from the Industrial Commission;
(4) Appeals from the Public Utilities Commission;
(5) Review of the recommendatory orders of the Board of
Commissioners of the Idaho State Bar;
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(6) Review of recommendatory orders of the Judicial Council.
LA.R. 108 (emphasis added). Since the issues raised in this appeal do not fall into any
of the foregoing categories, the Court of Appeals has the authority to address the issues
raised in Mr. Spicer's Appellant's Brief regarding the violation of his constitutional rights.
Second, by assigning this case to the Court of Appeals, the Idaho Supreme
Court would implicitly grant the Court of Appeals the authority to review Mr. Spicer's
claims about the constitutionality of its decision to deny Mr. Spicer's request for the
inclusion of the requested transcripts in the appellate record.

Notably, the Internal

Rules of the Supreme Court (hereinafter, I.R.S.C.) provide:
Assignment of Cases. The chief justice (or designee) shall make the
tentative assignment of cases as between the Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals. Copies of each assignment sheet shall be given to the
justices, affording each an opportunity to object and request the Court to
reconsider the assignment.

Any objection to the assignment shall be stated, with reasons, in writing
and circulated to all the justices.

At the request of any justice, the objection to the assignment shall be
taken up at conference.
I.R.S.C. 21. Thus, the assignment of cases is not an arbitrary process; according to the
Rule, it is a deliberate process which affords all the justices the ability to object and
provide input into the decision to assign a case to the Court of Appeals. Therefore, a
decision to assign a case to the Court of Appeals means that the Idaho Supreme Court
would have reached the conclusion that all the issues raised in this appeal could
properly be decided by the Court of Appeals.
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Third, the Court of Appeals has indicated that it would have the authority to rule
on the question of whether the requested transcripts need to be included in the
appellate record. Such authority would arise if the defendant-appellant filed a renewed
motion to augment with the Court of Appeals, once the case has been assigned thereto,
provided that motion is based on "new information or a new or expanded basis" that
was not presented to the Supreme Court. See State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618, 620
(Ct. App. 2012), rev. denied; State v. Cornelison, 154 Idaho 793, 796 (Ct. App. 2013),
rev. denied.

Therefore, for all the foregoing reasons, the State's assertion that the

Court of Appeals would be without the authority to rule on this issue (Resp. Br., pp.5-7)
is erroneous and should be rejected.
However, in the event that the State is correct about the scope of the Court of
Appeals' authority to rule on the issues presented in this appeal, then an order
assigning this case to the Court of Appeals would also constitute an independent
violation of Mr. Spicer's state and federal constitutional rights to due process. See
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; ID. CONST. art. I§ 13.

As the Idaho Supreme Court has

explained:
It is firmly established that due process requires notice and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965);
Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948). The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment also protects against arbitrary and capricious acts
of the government. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Due
process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair."
Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Serv. of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 24
(1981).
State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425,445 (1991).
In Idaho, a criminal defendant's right to appeal is created by statute.
I.C. § 19-2801.

See

Pursuant to that rule, defendants have the right to appeal from
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judgments affecting their substantial rights.

State v. Thomas, 146 Idaho 592, 594

(2008); I.AR. 11(c)(9). The decision to revoke probation is such an order. See, e.g.,

State v. Rose, 144 Idaho 762, 766 (2007) (recognizing that a probationer has a
protected liberty interest in continuing probation); see also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471, 489 (1972) (establishing the minimum due process requirements that must be
provided when the State seeks to revoke a person's probation, which includes a
meaningful opportunity to be heard).

Therefore, since the Fourteenth Amendment's

protections apply to all proceedings affecting this appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court
would violate those protections by assigning this case to the Court of Appeals knowing it
was without authority to resolve the issues presented therein because it would not
afford Mr. Spicer a meaningful opportunity to be heard on appeal.

B.

Properly Applying The Standard For Evaluating Whether A Transcript Needs To
Be Provided, The Grounds For Appeal Make Out A Colorable Need And The
State Has Failed To Demonstrate That A Viable Alternative Is Available To
Ensure An Adequate Appellate Record Is Available
Even under the standard articulated in the Idaho Supreme Court's recent opinion

in Brunet, the grounds of appeal in this case make out a colorable need for inclusion of
the transcripts of the sentencing hearing held on January 23, 2009, the disposition
hearing held on February 11, 2010, and the rider review hearing held on August 12,
2010. 1 The Brunet Opinion reaffirmed the existing standard of review, which is that,
when reviewing decisions such as the decision to relinquish jurisdiction, "this Court
conducts an independent review of the entire record available to the trial court at

1

Given the decision in Brunet, Mr. Spicer is no longer pursuing his claims for the
transcripts of the change of plea hearing held on October 2, 2008, and the admit/deny
hearing held on January 28, 2010.
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sentencing, focusing on the objectives of criminal punishment." Brunet, 316 P.3d at 644
(emphasis added) (citing State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5 (2010)). The Idaho Supreme
Court also recognized that there is a federal and state constitutional requirement for the
State to provide transcripts sufficient for an adequate appellate review.

See id. at

643-44 (citing Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 195 (1971); State v. Strand, 137
Idaho 457, 462 (2002)).
Therefore, the two fundamental themes established in the United States
Supreme Court decisions in this regard still control the analysis. The first fundamental
theme is that the scope of the due process and equal protection clauses is broad, and
the second is that disparate treatment of indigent defendants is not tolerable.

As a

result, the State must provide an adequate record for appellate review, but that record
need not include frivolous or unnecessary materials. See, e.g., Mayer, 404 U.S. at 195.
Therefore, the rule from Brunet is that, in order to show that the transcript requested is
necessary for an adequate appellate review, the party moving for its inclusion in the
record "must make out a colorable need for the additional transcripts." Brunet, 316 P.3d
at 643. That rule reflects the rule from the United States Supreme Court, but is not
exactly the same. In Mayer, the United States Supreme Court did not hold that the
appellant must show a colorable need; rather, it looked at the "grounds of appeal," (i.e.,
the record itself), and held that "where the grounds of appeal, as in this case, make out
a colorable need for a complete transcript, the burden is on the State to show that only
a portion of the transcript or an 'alternative' will suffice for an effective appeal on those
grounds". Mayer, 404 U.S. at 195.
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The State, based on the language in Brunet, misinterprets the burden of proof in
such cases, and erroneously contends that "[Mr.] Spicer failed to show a 'colorable
need' for any of the transcripts .... " {Resp. Br., p.8.) However, in his Appellant's Brief,
Mr. Spicer, as required by Mayer, pointed out that the grounds of appeal in his case do
make out a colorable need for the transcripts of the sentencing, disposition, and
jurisdictional review hearings based on the rules articulated by the Court of Appeals in
State v. Gervasi, 138 Idaho 813 (Ct. App. 2003), and State v. Hansen, 154 Idaho 882

(Ct. App. 2013), rev. denied. (App. Br., pp.12-14.)
In Gervasi, the Idaho Court of Appeals held that the defendant needs to have the
opportunity to make a statement in allocution because such statements are highly
relevant to the district court's sentencing determinations. Gervasi, 138 Idaho at 816.
Hansen clarified Gervasi, explaining that, while allocution is important, there is not a

constitutionally-protected right to allocute. Hansen, 154 Idaho at 887-88. The minutes
of the January 23, 2009, sentencing hearing reveal that Mr. Spicer "[a]ddresses the
Court." (R., pp.74-75.) That statement of allocution is, therefore, highly relevant to the
disposition of the recent probation violation. 2 See State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 648
(1998); State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 203, 205 (Ct. App. 1990). Therefore, the grounds of

The State argues that Mr. Spicer's request for inclusion of these transcripts in the
appellate record is just a "fishing expedition." (See Resp. Br., p.7.) That argument is
erroneous. The Idaho Supreme Court explained in Brunet that claims which only
hypothesized that factual information could exist in the transcript, which, if they exist,
might affect the issues raised on appeal constituted an impermissible "fishing
expedition." Brunet, 316 P.3d at 643. In this case, however, Mr. Spicer has identified
exactly what factual information would exist in those transcripts (the statements in
allocution) and articulated how having access to those statements would impact the
arguments raised on appeal (they would have provided additional mitigating information
which the district court needed to sufficiently consider). Thus, Mr. Spicer's request for
these transcripts does not constitute an impermissible fishing expedition.
2
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appeal make out a colorable need for the transcript of the January 23, 2009, sentencing
hearing.
Disposition and rider review hearings deal with similar concerns as sentencing
hearings.

See, e.g., State v. Goodlett, 139 Idaho 262, 263-64 (Ct. App. 2003)

(discussing these concerns as they relate to rider review hearings); State v. Chavez,
134 Idaho 308, 312 (Ct. App. 2000) (discussing these concerns as they relate to
disposition hearings). Those decisions are guided by the same factors that the district
court considers at sentencing.

See Merwin, 131 Idaho at 648.

Therefore, the

defendant's statements at a disposition or rider review hearing are as relevant to
subsequent sentencing determination as a statement in allocution made at an initial
sentencing hearing. See Hansen, 154 Idaho at 887-88; Getvasi, 138 Idaho at 816. The
minutes of the February 11, 2010, disposition hearing and the August 12, 2010, rider
review hearing indicate that Mr. Spicer "addresses the court." (R., pp.127, 135.) As
such, those statements are relevant to district court's subsequent decision to revoke
probation. Thus, the grounds of appeal make out a colorable need for the transcripts of
the February 11, 2010, disposition hearing and the August 12, 2010, rider review
hearing in this case.
The only other question, then, is whether the evidence provided at those
hearings was part of the entire record available to the district court when it subsequently
decided to revoke Mr. Spicer's probation. See Brunet, 316 P.3d at 644; Pierce, 150
Idaho at 5. The State contends that the information in the appellate record is sufficient
because the appellate record includes the information provided in the Presentence
Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), the Addendum to PSI (hereinafter, APSI), and
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the minutes of the hearings in question.

(Resp. Br., pp.6-7.)

This, it contends,

constitutes the extent of the record available to the district court, and thus, inclusion of
those materials provides a sufficient appellate record. (Resp. Br., pp.6-7.)
However, that argument fails to address the longstanding and still-viable case
law which holds that district court judges are expected to rely on their memories of prior
proceedings in a case. See, e.g., Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 367, 373-74 (Ct. App.
2001); see also State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 907 (1983); State v. Wallace, 98 Idaho
318, 321

(1977); Statev.Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1055-56 (Ct. App.

State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 491, 495 (Ct. App. 1984 ).

1989);

Since the same district court

judge who revoked Mr. Spicer's probation also presided over the sentencing,
disposition, and rider review hearings (compare R., pp.74-75, 126-27, 135-36, 173-76),
the judge could rely on his memory of the statements Mr. Spicer made in allocution.
Therefore, those statements are part of the record that was available to the district court
when it revoked Mr. Spicer's probation.
Furthermore, to the State's point that there are other documents which provide
relevant information to the district court, such as the PSI or APSI, they are not sufficient
to provide an alternative record of what Mr. Spicer told the district court during the
hearings in question. The minutes of all three hearings only indicate that Mr. Spicer
"[a]ddresses the Court." (R., pp.75, 127, 135.) Thus, all those minute entries reveal is
that Mr. Spicer made a statement, not the contents of those statements.

That is a

critical point, since, according to Gervasi and Hansen, it is the contents of the statement
which are important to the district court's decisions. See Hansen, 154 Idaho at 887-88;

Gervasi, 138 Idaho at 816.

And while the APSI does contain a statement made by
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Mr. Spicer (PSI, p.176), there is no indication in that document, or the record as a whole
for that matter, which suggests that Mr. Spicer's statement at the rider review hearing
was the same as the statement included in the APSl. 3 (See generally R.; PSI.) Thus,
while the PSI and APSI materials appended to the record do contain relevant
information to the district court's decisions, they fail to provide an adequate record of the
mitigating information Mr. Spicer provided in his statements to the district court during
the sentencing, disposition, and jurisdictional review hearings. Therefore, they are not
sufficient alternatives upon which this Court could conduct its review of the entire record
available to the district court when it revoked Mr. Spicer's probation and executed his
sentence without modification. 4 See Brunet, 316 P.3d at 643; Mayer, 404 U.S. at 195.
As such, the State has failed to meet its burden to show that only a portion of the

Even if the State is correct in that regard, the statement in the APSI is certainly not a
valid substitute for the statements in allocution made at the sentencing or disposition
hearings.
4 In that same vein, an adequate appellate record is necessary to vindicate Mr. Spicer's
constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., Evitts v. Lucey, 469
U.S. 387, 397 (1985) (relying on Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355-56 (1963),
and Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-45 (1963)). The State contends that
Mr. Spicer failed to demonstrate how counsel's performance fell outside the objective
standard of reasonableness, and therefore, there was no violation of his right to
effective counsel.
(Resp. Br., pp.7-8.)
Given that the objective standard of
reasonableness requires appellate counsel to "consider al/ issues that might affect the
validity of the judgment of conviction and sentence" and, therefore, appropriately advise
on the probable outcome of a challenge to the sentence, see American
Bar Association's Standards for Criminal Justice, Standard 4-8.3(b) (emphasis added),
appellate counsel needs to be able to review the entire record available to the district
court, as this Court would on review, in order to provide a professional evaluation of the
questions that might be presented on appeal and consider all issues that might have
affected the district court's decision to revoke probation, which is now at issue. As
such, not providing access to an adequate appellate record also denies Mr. Spicer
access to effective appellate counsel.
3
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transcript or an alternative will suffice to provide an adequate appellate record. Mayer,

404 U.S. at 195.
Ultimately, even under the standards articulated in Brunet, the decision to deny
Mr. Spicer's motion to augment the appellate record with the transcripts of the January
29, 2009, sentencing hearing, the February 11, 2010, disposition hearing, and the
August 12, 2010, rider review hearing violated his state and federal constitutional rights
to equal protection and due process.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Spicer respectfully requests access to the requested transcripts and the
opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which arise
as a result of that review. In the event this request is denied, Mr. Spicer respectfully
requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate, or, in the
alternative, remand the case for a new disposition hearing.
DATED this 19th day of March, 2014.

BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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